Unified Broadcast Encryption System

ABSTRACT

A system and method is disclosed for performing unified broadcast encryption and traitor tracing for digital content. In one embodiment a media key tree is divided into S subtrees, the media key tree including media keys and initial values, which may be random values. The digital content is divided into a plurality of segments and at least some of the segments are converted into a plurality of variations. The random values are transformed into media key variations and a separate media key variant is assigned to each of the subdivided subtrees. A unified media key block including the media key tree is stored on the media.

FIELD OF INVENTION

The present invention generally relates to systems and methods forprotecting digital content from unauthorized use, and particularly tosystems and methods for identifying devices involved in piracy ofdigital content and revoking secret keys used to pirate protecteddigital content.

BACKGROUND

The transition of the many types of media from analog to digital contentoffers new advantages to the consumer in quality and flexibility. Also,there is an increasing use of global distribution systems such as theInternet for distribution of digital assets including music, film,computer programs, photographs, games and other content. These trendshave made it easy to produce and distribute flawless copies of contentby content providers. Unfortunately, there is also a concurrent increasein the unauthorized copying, or pirating, of digital content, which hascaused considerable economic losses to content providers. Effectivecountermeasures are important to the viability of businesses engaged inthe distribution of digital media.

Piracy is a major concern and expense for content providers. To thisend, industry consortia such as the 4C Entity (<www.4centity.com>) andAACSLA (<www.aacsla.com>) have been formed. These groups are licensingagencies that provide content protection tools based on ContentProtection for Recordable Media (CPRM) and Advanced Access ContentSystem (AACS), respectively. CPRM is a technology developed and licensedby the 4C group, comprising IBM, Intel, Matsushita, and Toshiba, toallow consumers to make authorized copies of commercial entertainmentcontent where the copyright holder for such content has decided toprotect it from unauthorized copying. AACS is a follow-on technology forthe same purpose, under development by a group comprising IBM, Intel,Matsushita, Toshiba, Sony, Microsoft, Warner Brothers, and Disney.

CPRM and AACS protected files are encrypted with a key that is specificto a media identifier on the original storage medium (such as a DVD orCD-ROM etc.) of the protected file. Consequently, simply copying thecontent to another storage medium does not break the protection. Theessential building block for CPRM and AACS is structure called a mediakey block (MKB) that is distributed together with the content. The MKBis a file containing encryptions of a single media key by a large numberof keys known by compliant devices.

Each individual compliant device is assigned a set of unique device keysthat allow it to decrypt the MKB and obtain the media key from the MKB.The media key is then combined with the media identifier and othervalues to derive a title key used to decrypt the protected digitalcontent. If a device is revoked, using its device key to decrypt the MKBwill get garbage instead of a valid media key. By this method,revocation is performed in a typical content protection system such asCPRM and AACS. Details of the CPRM and AACS technology are availablefrom 4C and AACS. In particular, reference is made to the CPRM/CPPMspecification (http://www.4centity.com/tech) and to the AACSspecification (httg://www.aacsla.com/specification).

The cryptographic keys required to indirectly encrypt and decryptcontent are distributed from a key generation facility to devicemanufacturers and burn-into devices. Maintaining the secrecy of thecryptographic keys is essential for maintaining the integrity of asecure content protection scheme. For example, the device keys assignedto each device must be kept highly confidential. The consequences ofaccidental or malicious disclosure of the long-lived secret keys aregrave; loss of these secrets can lead total breakdown of the copyprotection schemes the secrets support and to potentially huge monetaryloss for the participants of the copy protection scheme.

Fundamentally, the AACS protection depends on the interaction betweentree-based device keys and the media key block, which allows unlimited,precise cryptographic revocation of compromised devices without dangerof collateral damage to innocent devices. See for example, U.S. Pat. No.7,039,803, which is incorporated by reference. One possible pirateattack on this system is that attackers reverse-engineer their devices,extract device keys from the devices, and build a clone device usingthose extracted device keys. To defend against this type of pirateattack and identify which devices are involved in building the clonedevice, forensic MKBs are carefully crafted. The forensic MKB is aspecial purpose MKB that is applied to the clone device. The outcome ofapplying the forensic MKB to the clone device is observed. After asequence of applied forensic MKBs and observed outcomes, one can deducewhich device keys are used in the clone device. Once the device keys areidentified, they can be revoked in the newly-produced MKBs. In the art,finding which devices are involved in building the clone device iscalled “traitor tracing”.

Another type of pirate attack in the above content protection system isan anonymous attack, wherein an attacker or group of attackers tries tohide their secret device keys and operate anonymously. In this attack,the attackers instrument their devices and collude to build a piratecopy of the decrypted plaintext content or the decryption key itself.The attackers can then redistribute the plaintext content or thedecryption key. How does one know which devices are involved inconstructing the pirate copy when the pirate copy is recovered? Onesolution is to differently watermark and differently encrypt each moviefor each authorized device so that the watermarking and encryptioninformation uniquely identifies the compromised box. Alas, this solutionis not feasible because of the excessive computing effort andtransmission bandwidth required to prepare and transmit individualizedmovies. The distribution system is economical only if the movies can bedistributed over broadcast channels; i.e., every receiver getssubstantially the same data at the same time.

In the art, there is another type of traitor tracing technology that isused to identify which devices are involved in constructing the piratecopy of the content. In one particular instance of this approach, anoriginal version of each movie file is augmented before being broadcast.Specifically, the file that is actually broadcast has had at least onecritical file segment replaced by a set of segment variations. Each filesegment variation is differently encrypted and also differentlywatermarked prior to encryption, although the entire file may bewatermarked as well. All the variations in one segment are identical forviewing purposes though digitally different. A particular receiver, orplayer, using an assigned secret cryptographic key can decrypt only oneof the variations in each segment. All legitimate receivers with validsecret keys can play the content through different segment combinations.If the receiver is compromised and is used to illegally rebroadcasteither the keys or the segments themselves, it is possible to deducewhich receiver or receivers have been compromised after recovering asufficient number of pirated content or keys.

After the devices involved in the anonymous attack are identified, thedevice keys associated with these devices can be revoked in futurecontent releases. To enable revocation, a structure similar to the MKBis used. For example, in AACS, the assigned secret cryptographic keysthat enable traitor tracing for anonymous attack are called sequencekeys, similar to device keys. The structure that can incorporaterevocation information is called a sequence key block (SKB). Anycompliant device can use its valid sequence key to process the SKB andobtain a key that can indirectly decrypt the content.

Although conventional traitor tracing technology has proven to beuseful, it would be desirable to present additional improvements.Current content protection systems such as AACS utilize two separatesystems, the media key block and the sequence key block. The media keyblock is tree based and is used to thwart an attack in which a clonedevice is constructed from a set of pirated device keys. The clonedevice can be illegally used to copy copyrighted content and can be soldon the black market. The sequence key block is matrix-based, and is usedto thwart an attack in which sequence keys, title keys, or an entiredecrypted movie is redistributed. Utilizing two separate systemsrequires additional storage on media and calculation by the mediadevice, affecting performance of a digital content system.

Furthermore, deploying two separate systems is inefficient and timeconsuming. Using media key blocks to revoke traitors provides goodrevocation provided that traitors can be identified when clone devicesare recovered. However, this type of tracing based on forensic MKBs maytake an excess amount of time and the scheme can be overwhelmed. On theother hand, using sequence key blocks provides good tracing, butrevocation is limited. Further, as sequence keys are revoked in thesequence key block, tracing capability is degraded.

One approach to addressing these issues is disclosed in U.S. patentapplication Ser. No. 11/746,491, now U.S. Pat. No. 7,876,895, entitled“System, Method, and Service for Performing Unified Broadcast Encryptionand Traitor Tracing for Digital Content”, and assigned to the sameassignee as the present application. This patent application discloseshow a player's device keys could be used for both the clone attacks andfor the anonymous attacks. This eliminates the need for sequence keysand sequence key blocks (at least for newly manufactured devices).Basically, this unified broadcast encryption technique uses the mediakey block to directly produce the media key variant. In turn, the mediakey variant can be used in a backwards way to calculate the actual mediakey, which is still used to protect the bulk of the movie. In additionto the obvious simplicity of this approach, the forensics against bothkinds of attacks is substantially increased.

While the unified broadcast encryption as disclosed in U.S. patentapplication Ser. No. 11/746,491, now U.S. Pat. No. 7,876,895, offers anumber of advantages, there are some limitations to the technique. Forexample, the number of media key variants is limited to about 1024.

Further, there is a need for additional improvements to currenttechniques for dealing with pirated media. For example, Blu-Raytechnology has a Java program on the disc as well as a “security VMprogram”, called BD+. The details of BD+ are confidential; however, ithas been described by its proponents as being very similar to thepublicly-described technology, called Self-protected Digital Content(SPDC), developed by Cryptography Research, Inc. The purpose of this VMmachine program is to “sniff” the platform it is running on and try todetermine if it is a circumvention platform or a legitimate player. Ifit is the former, it refuses to allow the movie to play.

It turns out that SPDC technology has a flaw: how does it determine itis on a problematic platform to begin the sniffing? A public-keyinfrastructure has been proposed, where the platform presentscredentials to the virtual program on the disc. The problem is that theprogram has to check the credentials, using the basic instructions thatare completely under control of the potential circumvention platform. Itis not clear that is even possible against a cleverly-designedcircumvention program.

Accordingly, there is a need for an improved system and associatedmethod for performing unified broadcast encryption and traitor tracingfor digital content that provides unified broadcast encryption withoutits limitation on the number of media key variants. There is also a needfor such as system that would SPDC systems, such as BD+, so that theplatform must tell the truth about where it is in the media key block orelse the virtual program will not correctly transform the media key.

BRIEF SUMMARY

To overcome the limitations in the prior art briefly described above,the present invention provides a method, computer program product, andsystem for performing unified broadcast encryption using software keyconversion data.

In one embodiment of the present invention, a processor-implementedmethod of performing a unified broadcast encryption and a traitortracing for digital content comprises: dividing a media key tree into Ssubtrees, the media key tree including media keys and initial values;dividing the digital content into a plurality of segments and convertingat least some of the segments into a plurality of variations;transforming the initial values into media key variations; assigning aseparate media key variant to each of the subdivided subtrees; storing aunified media key block including the media key tree on the media;decrypting the digital content by reading and processing the media keyblock on said media to obtain the media key variations required for eachof the variations of the digital content; and transforming the initialvalues using a program on the media into media key variations.

In another embodiment of the present invention, a processor-implementedsystem for performing a unified broadcast encryption and traitor tracingfor a digital content stored on digital media comprises: a unified mediakey block module including a media key tree having media keys andinitial values, the initial values being transformable into media keyvariations; the unified media key block module dividing the digitalcontent into a plurality of segments and converting at least some of thesegments into a plurality of variations; and a transformation unit fortransforming the initial values into media key variations, wherein theunified media key block module generates a unified media key blockencrypting the digital content.

In a further embodiment of the present invention a method for encryptingdigital content, comprises: receiving digital content; introducing aplurality of content variations into the media; generating a media keytree including media keys and initial values; transforming the initialvalues into media key variations; assigning a separate media key variantto subtrees within the media key tree; storing a unified media key blockincluding the media key tree on the digital media; calculating at leastone title key and identify at least zero content variations; and theunified media key block module decrypting the particular variation ofthe segment, for each segment in the content, using the calculated titlekey.

In another embodiment of the present invention, a computer programproduct comprises a computer usable medium having a computer readableprogram, wherein the computer readable program when executed on acomputer causes the computer to: generate a media key tree includingmedia keys and initial values; divide the digital content into aplurality of segments and convert at least some of the segments into aplurality of variations; transform the initial values into media keyvariations; assign a separate media key variant to each of thesubdivided subtrees; and store a unified media key block including themedia key tree on the media.

Various advantages and features of novelty, which characterize thepresent invention, are pointed out with particularity in the claimsannexed hereto and form a part hereof. However, for a betterunderstanding of the invention and its advantages, reference should bemade to the accompanying descriptive matter together with thecorresponding drawings which form a further part hereof, in which thereare described and illustrated specific examples in accordance with thepresent invention.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE SEVERAL VIEWS OF THE DRAWINGS

The present invention is described in conjunction with the appendeddrawings, where like reference numbers denote the same elementthroughout the set of drawings:

FIG. 1 is a schematic illustration of an exemplary operating environmentin which a unified broadcast encryption system can be used;

FIG. 2 is a block diagram of an encrypted content using an augmentedfile and encrypted variations as utilized by the unified broadcastencryption system of FIG. 1;

FIG. 3 is a diagram of an exemplary variant key table used by theunified broadcast encryption system of FIG. 1 to decrypt encryptedcontent;

FIG. 4 is a schematic illustration of an exemplary operating environmentof a unified broadcast encryption system incorporating soft keyconversion data (KCD) in accordance with an embodiment of the invention;

FIG. 5 is a schematic illustration of a unified broadcast encryptionsystem incorporating soft KCDs in accordance with an embodiment of theinvention;

FIG. 6 is a schematic illustration of a unified media key block usedwith the unified broadcast encryption system incorporating soft KCDs inaccordance with an embodiment of the invention;

FIG. 7 is a schematic illustration of a unified media key block havingcompatibility with legacy devices used with the unified broadcastencryption system incorporating soft KCDs in accordance with anembodiment of the invention; and

FIG. 8 is a flow chart of a process for encrypting digital content inaccordance with an embodiment of the invention.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

The present invention overcomes the problems associated with the priorart by teaching a system, computer program product, and method forperforming improved unified broadcast encryption with efficientrevocation and tracing. In the following detailed description, numerousspecific details are set forth in order to provide a thoroughunderstanding of the present invention. Those skilled in the art willrecognize, however, that the teachings contained herein may be appliedto other embodiments and that the present invention may be practicedapart from these specific details. Accordingly, the present inventionshould not be limited to the embodiments shown, but is to be accordedthe widest scope consistent with the principles and features describedand claimed herein. The following description is presented to enable oneof ordinary skill in the art to make and use the present invention andis provided in the context of a patent application and its requirements.

The invention addresses problems associated with the piracy of digitalcontent. The invention utilizes software key conversion data (KCD), alsoreferred to as soft KCDs, in combination with the above-describedunified media key blocks. With soft KCDs there is a program on the moviedisc that also acts to transform the media key. Different devices canhave different transformations, because different parts of the media keyblock could calculate different initial values. In contrast, in priorsystems, data for this transformation is encoded in a secret way on themove disc. It is thus a hardware KCD, because it requires special discdrive hardware to read the data.

The present invention has significant advantages over current unifiedmedia key block systems art in that it overcomes the limitation on thenumber of media key variants of about 1 024 variations. In the presentinvention the number of such variations is limited only by the size ofthe media key block. For example, a media key block with 32,000variations would be very practical. Also, the present inventionovercomes the above-described problem with SPDC by requiring an attackerplatform to tell the truth about which of the keys it has, or thevirtual program will not work. As a result, the “sniffing” feature ofSPDC is enabled.

FIG. 1 portrays an exemplary overall environment in which a system 10,for performing unified broadcast encryption and traitor tracing fordigital content according to the present invention may be used. Thepresent invention may be used in a variety of content protectionapplications including but not limited to DVDs, downloaded content,software and others. FIGS. 1-3 show the system 10 for performing unifiedbroadcast encryption as disclosed in U.S. patent application Ser. No.11/746,491, now U.S. Pat. No. 7,876,895, entitled “System, Method, andService for Performing Unified Broadcast Encryption and Traitor Tracingfor Digital Content”, the contents of which are incorporated herein byreference. A summary of this system 10 is presented in FIGS. 1-3,however, additional details may be found in U.S. patent application Ser.No. 11/746,491, now U.S. Pat. No. 7,876,895.

System 10 comprises a unified media key block module 15, a traitordetection module 20, a media module 25, and a media player module 30.The media player module 30 comprises a device key set 35 that isuniquely associated with a media player 40. The media player 40 maycomprise any one of a number of devices used to play digital media,including, but not limited to DVD players, personal computers, movierental boxes which are allowed to play a movie for a limited period oftime, and others. The media player module 30 further comprises asoftware programming code or a computer program product that istypically embedded within, or installed on the media player 40.

The media module 25 comprises a unified media key block 45(interchangeably reference herein as MKBu 45) and a variant key table50. The unified media key block 45 comprises a subset of availabledevice keys and a data part in which each of the subset of device keysindividually encrypts a set of media key variants. For example, thesubset of device keys may be organized in a tree structure, such as inthe subset-difference broadcast encryption scheme, although allbroadcast encryption schemes are within the scope of this invention. Themedia module 25 comprises a software programming code or a computerprogram product that is saved onto a media 55.

The unified media key block module 15 generates one or more unifiedmedia key blocks for use by a content provider 60 to place on the media55 together with an encrypted digital content 65 (interchangeablyreferenced herein as encrypted content 65). The unified media key blockmodule 15 comprises a software programming code or a computer programproduct that is typically embedded within, or installed on a server 70that belongs to a separate facility, for example, a license agency 75.Alternatively, system 10 can be saved on a suitable memory or storagemedium such as a diskette, a CD, a DVD, a hard drive, or like devices.

The traitor detection module 20 identifies the device keys that havebeen compromised by a traitor or have been pirated. The traitordetection module 20 passes the identified device keys to the unifiedmedia key block module 15 to revoke those identified device keys fromany future unified media key blocks, preventing further piracy by thattraitor or attacker. The traitor detection module 20 comprises asoftware programming code or computer program product that is shown, forillustration purposes only, as embedded within, or installed on server70 of the license agency 75. Alternatively, the traitor detection module20 may be installed in a separate facility other than the one thatissues unified media key blocks to content providers.

The media player 40 can access a server 80 of the content provider 60through a network 85 to obtain the encrypted digital content 65 and atitle key 90. The title key 90 (interchangeably referenced herein as Kt90) allows the media player 40 to decrypt and play the encrypted content65 after the encrypted content 65 has been recorded to media 55. Thetitle key 90 is encrypted, and requires the media player 40 to correctlyprocess the unified media key block 45 to decrypt and use the unifiedmedia key block 45. The content provider 60 may record the encryptedcontent 65 and the encrypted title key 90 directly to the media 55 suchas, for example, a CD or DVD. A user may then obtain the encryptedcontent 65 by, for example, purchasing the CD.

The media player 40 comprises any compliant module that can verify thephysical presence of a media 55 such as, for example, a disk. Acompliant module is one that follows the usage rules of the media module25 that are cryptographically bound to media 55. For example, acompliant recorder does not record content encoded “do not copy”.

FIG. 1 illustrates an exemplary application of system 10 referenced as“electronic sell-through” in which a consumer obtains the encryptedcontent 65 by downloading the encrypted content 65 from the contentprovider 60 onto a media 55 such as recordable disk in the home of theconsumer. While described in terms of an “electronic sell-through”application, it should be clear that system 10 is applicable as well to,for example, any application in which authentication is important andthe authenticators are restricted to a subset of the participants.Furthermore, while illustrated as providing secure encryption of contentfor delivery to media, it should be clear that system 10 is applicableas well to, for example, any type of content delivery.

System 10 can take the form of an entirely hardware embodiment, anentirely software embodiment or an embodiment containing both hardwareand software elements. In one embodiment, system 10 is implemented insoftware, which includes but is not limited to firmware, residentsoftware, microcode, etc.

Furthermore, system 10 can take the form of a computer program productaccessible from a computer-usable or computer-readable medium providingprogram code for use by or in connection with a computer or anyinstruction execution system. The computer program product comprises theinstructions that implement a method of system 10. For the purposes ofthis description, a computer-usable or computer readable medium can beany apparatus that can contain, store, communicate, propagate, ortransport the program for use by or in connection with the instructionexecution system, apparatus, or device.

The medium can be an electronic, magnetic, optical, electromagnetic,infrared, or semiconductor system (or apparatus or device) or apropagation medium. Examples of a computer-readable medium include asemiconductor or solid-state memory, magnetic tape, a removable computerdiskette, a random access memory (RAM), a read-only memory (ROM), arigid magnetic disk, and an optical disk. Current examples of opticaldisks include compact disk-read only memory (CD-ROM), compactdisk-read/write (CDR/W) and DVD.

Input/output or I/O devices (including but not limited to keyboards,displays, pointing devices, etc.) can be coupled to the system eitherdirectly or through intervening I/O controllers.

Network adapters may also be coupled to the system to enable the dataprocessing system to become coupled to other data processing systems orremote printers or storage devices through intervening private or publicnetworks. Modems, cable modems, and Ethernet cards are just a few of thecurrently available types of network adapters.

FIG. 2 illustrates a diagram of a conventional modified or augmenteddistributed file 200 comprising encrypted content 65, shown in FIG. 1.This file is described in detail in U.S. patent application Ser. No.10/315,395, filed Dec. 9, 2002, and entitled “Method for TracingTraitors and Preventing Piracy of Digital Content in a BroadcastEncryption System”, which is incorporated by reference herein. Theaugmented file 200 is the modified version of an original file to bebroadcast or distributed on prerecorded media. The augmented file 200comprises sets of file variations that replaced critical file segments.For example, a first critical file segment has been replaced withvariations 205, 210, 215, and 220, while a second critical file segmenthas been replaced with variations 225, 230, 235, and 240, and so forth.

Each file segment variation is a copy of the particular correspondingcritical file segment that has been differently watermarked anddifferently encrypted using a variation encrypting key (called title keyfor the variation). Each file segment variation is identified by a textdesignation in this application (e.g., A, B, C . . . etc.) for clarity,but in practice binary numbers are generally employed for this purpose.Furthermore, while four variations are shown for each critical filesegment, in operation any number of variations may replace a criticalfile segment. In one embodiment, approximately 12 to 16 variations areused per critical file segment, with approximately 250 to 1000variations per augmented file 200.

The number of critical file segments and the number of variationsemployed depends on the properties of the file and its audience. Formovies, one may select a single critical file segment and have severalhundred file segment variations; however, attackers may simply choose toomit that single critical file segment in a pirated copy of the file, inhopes that viewers may not find such a glitch to be overly annoying. Apirated movie with, for example, 15 missing critical 5-second scenes ismost likely too annoying to any viewer for it to be of any commercialvalue. Thus, the illegally broadcast movies are either substantiallydisrupted or the attackers must incorporate some of their file segmentvariations, which facilitates unified traitor tracing.

Each intended receiver of the broadcast requires variation selectioninformation to choose a particular combination of file segmentvariations for each file. In terms of a movie rental box scenario, eachmovie rental box knows, for each movie, which set of variations to pluginto the spaces where critical scenes existed in the original movie. Theparticular arrangement of unmodified file content and file segmentvariations within the augmented file 200 shown is not critical but ismerely intuitive.

The variations facilitate unified traitor tracing in a commerciallyviable (i.e., low bandwidth overhead) manner. If a pirated version of afile is found, say on the Internet, the identity of the particular movierental box (or boxes) that was used to create the pirated version is ofkeen interest to the broadcaster and/or content creator (e.g., copyrightowners). The broadcaster and/or content creator may institute legalproceedings against the culprit, and would certainly want to refuse tosend new decryption keys to the compromised boxes to prevent futurethievery. If different boxes are assigned different combinations of filesegment variations to use, an analysis of a pirated file can helpdetermine which boxes were used as part of an anonymous attack.

In the event that all of the file segment variations in a redistributedversion of a file match the combination of file segment variationsassigned to only a single movie rental box, conventional systemsnormally identify that box as being the source of the redistributedfile. However, attackers are becoming increasingly sophisticated and maychoose to employ a number of boxes to produce a pirated version of afile via collusion, wherein each box contributes some information orcontent used to produce the illicit copy after enough such informationor content has been accumulated.

In conventional broadcast encryption technologies, a media key blockresides on a physical piece of media such as a DVD. The media playeruses a device key uniquely associated with the media player to decryptthe media key block and obtain a media key, Km, and a title key, Kt. Inthe example of AACS that deploys both a media key block system and asequence key block (SKB) systems, the media key is used as input forprocessing a sequence key block to obtain a media key variant, Kmv. Thetitle key is used to decrypt segments in the augmented file 200. Themedia key variant is used to obtain the title key for each segment.

In contrast, system 10 utilizes the variant key table 50 in which adifferent title key may be used for each variation in a segment in theaugmented file 200. Rather than having a separate sequence key block,system 10 merges indirection concepts used by the sequence key block andthe title key into the variant key table.

FIG. 3 illustrates an exemplary variant key table 50. The variant keytable 50 comprises one or more exemplary columns such as a column 1,305, a column 2, 310, and a column m, 315, collectively referenced ascolumns 320. The variant key table 50 comprises rows such as a row 1,325, a row 2, 330, a row 3, 335, a row i, 340, through a row n, 345,collectively referenced as rows 350. Rows 350 are generically referencedas the row i, 340. Each of the rows 350 in the variant key table 50corresponds to a media key variant. For example, the row i, 340,corresponds to a media key variant i. Each of the columns 320 in thevariant key table 50 corresponds to a segment in the encrypted digitalcontent 65. For example, column 1, 305, corresponds to a segment in theencrypted digital content 65 in which there are no variations, and everymedia player calculates the same title key. The column 2, 310, and thecolumn m, 315, each corresponds to segments in the encrypted digitalcontent 65 of which there are variations; different media player modulessuch as the media player module 30 may use different title keys todecrypt the variations. The assignment of columns is for exemplarypurposes only. The encrypted digital content 65 may comprise one or moresegments without variations and zero or more segments with variations.Each segment of the encrypted digital content 65 has a correspondingcolumn in the variant key table 50.

Entries in the variant key table 50 comprise two values, an encryptedtitle key and a variant number. These values are denoted as“(Ktx)e(Kmi),x” in FIG. 3. For example, in column 1, 305, all theentries show variant 1, but in each entry the title key (Kt1)corresponding to this segment is differently encrypted: the title key,Kt, is encrypted with the media key variant. The column 2, 310,corresponds to a point in the movie in which there are variations. Thecolumn 2, 310, comprises different variant numbers, one variant numberfor each variation. In general, there are fewer variations at any givenpoint in the movie than there are media key variants; consequentlycontents of rows may repeat within the variant key table 50 asillustrated by the row 1, 325, and the row n, 345.

The media player module 30 accesses a row in the variant key table 50based on the media key variant of the media player module 30. Forexample, if the media player module 30 has media key variant i, themedia player module 30 uses row i, 340, in the variant key table 50.From entries in the accessed row, the media player 40 is able to decrypttitle keys for each segment in the encrypted digital content 65 and toidentify which variation to use in those segments that have more thanone variation. The media player 40 obtains the necessary media keyvariant number from the unified media key block 15 by, for example, aspecial field. Alternatively, low-order bits of the media key variantcan be used to identify the media key variant number. This approachslightly reduces the strength of the key, but allows compatibility withconventional (nonunified) media key blocks.

If a single value is encrypted by many different keys, as is being doneespecially in the column 1, 305, of the example variant key table 50,system 10 is susceptible to an attack called the Birthday ParadoxAttack. It is a simple matter to avoid this attack by, for example,XORing the title key with the row number before encrypting it with themedia key variant. This normal practice is not shown in FIG. 3, forpurposes of clarity, but may used in one embodiment.

FIG. 4 shows a system 400 for performing unified broadcast encryptionand traitor tracing according to the present invention. In particular,the present invention performs unified broadcast encryption and traitortracing using software key conversion data (KCDs). Key conversion datais a term used by AACS to describe a transformation on the media key inthe media key block. Currently, the data for this transformation isencoded in a secret way on the movie disc; therefore, it is a hardwareKCD, because it requires special disc drive hardware to read the data.The idea of a software KCD is that there is a program on the movie discthat also acts to transform the media key. Different devices can havedifferent transformations, because different parts of the media keyblock could calculate different initial values.

In accordance with an embodiment of the invention, the media 455includes a key transformation program 500. As in the system 10 shown inFIG. 1, in system 400, different media players 440 calculate differentvalues from the unified media key block with soft KCDs 445 based onwhich part of the media key block their device uses. Some of these keysmight be media key variants from the variant key table 450. In contrastto the system 10 shown in FIG. 1, however, other keys may be randomvalues that need to be transformed by the key transformation program 500on the media 455. The key transformation program 500 may be incorporatedinto existing programs on the disc. Examples of such programs, include,BD+, HDi, and BD-J.

System 400 includes a unified media key block with soft KCDs module 415,a traitor detection module 420, a media module 425, and a media playermodule 430. The media player module 430 comprises a device key set 435that is uniquely associated with a media player 440. The media playermodule 430 further comprises a software programming code or a computerprogram product that is typically embedded within, or installed on themedia player 440.

The media module 425 comprises a unified media key block with soft KCDs445 (interchangeably reference herein as MKBu with soft KCDs 445) and avariant key table 450. The unified media key block with soft KCDs 445comprises a subset of available device keys and a data part in whicheach of the subset of device keys individually encrypts a set of mediakey variants. For example, the subset of device keys may be organized ina tree structure, such as in the subset-difference broadcast encryptionscheme, although all broadcast encryption schemes are within the scopeof this invention. In accordance with the present invention, the mediakey block with soft KCDs 445 includes different keys in different partsof the media key block, just as with the media key block 45 shown inFIG. 1. However, in the media key block with soft KCDs 445, some of thekeys may be random values that need to be transformed by a soft KCDtransformation in a program on the media disc 455 as described in moredetail in connection with FIG. 5. The media module 425 comprises asoftware programming code or a computer program product that is savedonto a media 455.

The unified media key block with soft KCDs module 415 generates one ormore unified media key blocks incorporating soft KCDs for use by acontent provider 460 to place on the media 455 together with anencrypted digital content 465 (interchangeably referenced herein asencrypted content 465). The unified media key block with soft KCDsmodule 415 comprises a software programming code or a computer programproduct that is typically embedded within, or installed on a server 470that belongs to a separate facility, for example, a license agency 475.Alternatively, system 400 can be saved on a suitable memory or storagemedium such as a diskette, a CD, a DVD, a hard drive, or like devices.

The traitor detection module 420 identifies the device keys that havebeen compromised by a traitor or have been pirated. The traitordetection module 420 passes the identified device keys to the unifiedmedia key block module 415 to revoke those identified device keys fromany future unified media key blocks, preventing further piracy by thattraitor or attacker. The traitor detection module 420 comprises asoftware programming code or computer program product that is shown, forillustration purposes only, as embedded within, or installed on server470 of the license agency 475. Alternatively, the traitor detectionmodule 420 may be installed in a separate facility other than the onethat issues unified media key blocks to content providers.

The media player 440 can access a server 480 of the content provider 460through a network 485 to obtain the encrypted digital content 465, atitle key 490, and a key transformation program 500. The title key 490(interchangeably referenced herein as Kt 490) allows the media player440 to decrypt and play the encrypted content 465 after the encryptedcontent 465 has been recorded to media 455. The title key 490 isencrypted, and requires the media player 440 to correctly process theunified media key block 445 to decrypt and use the unified media keyblock 445. The content provider 460 may record the encrypted content465, the encrypted title key 490, and the key transformation program 500directly to the media 455 such as, for example, a CD or DVD. A user maythen obtain the encrypted content 465 by, for example, purchasing theCD.

The media player 440 comprises any compliant module that can verify thephysical presence of a media 455 such as, for example, a disk. Acompliant module is one that follows the usage rules of the media module425 that are cryptographically bound to media 455. For example, acompliant recorder does not record content encoded “do not copy”.

FIG. 5 illustrates additional details of the operation of the system400. In particular, the unified MKB 445 includes soft KDCs 502, whichinclude a plurality of media keys 504. Some of the media keys 504comprise random values that are transformed by a transformation process506. The transformation process 506 may be performed by the keytransformation program 500 on the media 510. Other media keys 508 maycomprise media keys which are processed as described in system 10 shownin FIG. 1.

It is noted that the end result of the soft KCD transformation is amedia key variant, not a media key as in the system 10 shown in FIG. 1.In the system 10 the number of media key variants was limited to about1024, as shown by the media key variants 512 generated by the media 510.This limitation was a result of the extra space on the media 510 thatwas needed for the associated variations in the content. However, inaccordance with an embodiment of the invention, with the system 400,some parts of the media key block with soft KCDs 445 can have initialvalues that are unpredictable to the attackers, such as random numbers,which are later transformed into one of the media key variants 512. Manyinitial values can be mapped into a single media key variant 512. Thusthe previous limit of 1024 is eliminated. For example, the media keyblock with soft KCDs 445 might be divided into 32,000 different keys, ormore. An attacker's platform must tell the truth about which of the keysit has, or the virtual program will not calculate the correct KCD asdescribed in more detail below.

The media key variants 512 are input into a variant key table 514, whichgenerates outputs 515 that enable the media player 440 to play thecontent 516 using the file segments 518 specified by the media keyvariants 512. This process is similar to that described above inconnection with FIGS. 2-3.

One way to use the system 400 may be understood by considering a cloneattack example where the attackers have built a circumvention program toallow users to make unauthorized copies of DVDs they have rented. Theprogram has built in one or more device key sets, which the attackershave obtained illegally. It is now the job of a licensing agency todetermine precisely which device key sets the attackers' program isusing, so that they can be revoked in future media key blocks on newlyreleased movies.

Some of the advantages of this invention are shown in FIG. 6. Prior tothis invention, the licensing agency builds a forensic disc, which has amovie with 1024 variations, a media key block 600 that generates 1024media key variants. This figure shows a hypothetical current state of aforensic test where the attackers have 32 sets of device keys. The ‘X’s610 show the current knowledge of the licensing agency—the agency knowsthe attackers have a set of device keys somewhere in the subtree rootedat each X, but does not know which actual leaf the attackers are at ineach subtree. The licensing agency divides each of the attackers subtreeinto one of 1024/32 (=32) media key variants. After the test, theattackers must respond with one of the 1024 variations, and thelicensing agency will now know that the attackers are in the subtree ofthat variation. In effect, one of the ‘X’s will have moved down the treecloser to the leaves. The licensing agency performs an additional test,subdividing the new smaller subtree. After each test, one ‘X’ will movedown, and after enough tests all the ‘X’s will be at the leaves, meaningthat the licensing agency knows precisely which key sets that attackershave. At that point, it is easy to revoke the attackers in newlyreleased content.

Now consider the advantages of this invention. The licensing agency cannow divide the tree into, for example, 32,000 subtrees. The licensingagency also builds a program that transforms those keys until theybecome one of the keys that encrypt one of the 1024 variations. Thelicensing agency purchases a copy of the circumvention program, andfeeds it the forensic disc. The first thing the program on the disc asksthe platform is: “where exactly are you in the media key block?”. Theplatform must honestly answer with one of its device key sets;otherwise, the licensing agency's program will not perform the soft KCDtransform correctly, and the platform will not be able to decrypt themovie to make the unauthorized copy. Note, as far as the platform knows,this disc is a legitimate movie that some end-user is asking it to copy.The licensing agency, once it knows the platform's answer to a givenmedia key block, produces new media key blocks with a divide-and-conqueralgorithm until it knows precisely which device key sets the clone has.Because it can subdivide the tree into much finer subtrees, it takesfewer tests to achieve success.

However, the disc's virtual program must figure out how to expose theplatform's answer to the outside world. Note that, the virtual programis running in the circumvention platform, and a cleverly designedplatform will be trying to protect the virtual program so that it cannotreveal the platform internals. Fortunately for the licensing agency,this is a very difficult problem for the attackers. For example, modernmovie players contain complete nonvolatile file systems, the purpose ofwhich is to allow studios to support interactions between movies. Forexample, a disc with a movie sequel on it can use the file system toprovide some data to enhance the playback of the disc of the originalmovie. If the circumvention program ignored the file system, then thestudios could undoubtedly construct movie playbacks that would defeatthe circumvention program. Thus, the forensic virtual program on thedisc can use the file system, and can use not just file data, but filenames, or even the offset of file seeks, to communicate informationoutside of the platform.

The present invention may set up an arms race between the licensingagency and the attackers. However, the licensing agency has all theadvantages—the attackers must prevent all forensic ways; the licensingagency only needs to find one that works. And in the worst case, thelicensing agency falls back to the 1024 variations built into themovies, which the attackers cannot get around. Note that the presentinvention does not change the basic tracing logic explained in thesystem 10 shown in FIG. 1. Instead, it greatly increases the speed andprecision of the testing, and/or greatly complicates the attackers' job.

There are two additional details to consider. First, it is unnecessaryfor the virtual program on the disc to have access to the actual keyvalues in the MKB. Consider the following example API, shown aspseudo-code:

public AppKeyHandle createKey(

-   -   int key); // denotes title, device, media key, etc.

public AppKeyHandle deriveKey(

-   -   AppKeyHandle key, // key to derive    -   int op, // AND/OR/XOR/ADD/SUB/ROT/AES-G    -   byte[ ] immediate); // apply with op to key

// (player checks all derivations of the media key

// to see if it verifies)

The virtual program calls “createKey” to get a handle to a key in themedia key block, not the actual key. It then instructs the secure layerto transform this key in various ways, using “deriveKey”. Those skilledin the art will recognize that “AES-G” is AACS's terminology for aparticular one-way function. After each transformation, the secure layerchecks to see if the resulting key is a media key variant; if so, it hasall the cryptographic information it needs to play the movie. Note thatthe person who designed the virtual program would need to know theactual key values in the media key block. However, with this type ofinterface, another person who did not know that information could notpossibly write a virtual program to reveal it.

The second point to consider is that the present invention can beapplied in a way that is backwards compatible with existing AACSplayers. As shown in FIG. 7, media key blocks 700 can be logicallydivided into two parts, the legacy part 702 and the new part 704. Allexisting devices would have device keys in the legacy part 702 and wouldcalculate the media key directly from the media key block like they dotoday. They would also process Sequence Key Blocks 706 to determine themedia key variants. However, new devices, designed to take advantage ofthe present invention, would be in the new part 704 of the media keyblock that was also taking advantage of the present invention. In otherwords, new devices would directly calculate media key variants or softKCD precursor keys, as designed by the licensing agency.

FIG. 8 is a flow chart of a process 800 for encrypting digital contentin accordance with an embodiment of the invention. In step 802, a mediakey tree is created, which includes media key variants and randomnumbers. In step 804, the media tree is divided into S subtrees. A filecontaining the digital content to be encrypted is then divided intosegments, in step 806. The random numbers are transformed into subtreekeys in step 808. In step 810, a separate media key variant is assignedto different sets of subtrees. A media key block incorporating the abovekeys is then stored on the media containing the digital content in step812.

References in the claims to an element in the singular is not intendedto mean “one and only” unless explicitly so stated, but rather “one ormore.” All structural and functional equivalents to the elements of theabove-described exemplary embodiment that are currently known or latercome to be known to those of ordinary skill in the art are intended tobe encompassed by the present claims. No claim element herein is to beconstrued under the provisions of 35 U.S.C. section 112, sixthparagraph, unless the element is expressly recited using the phrase“means for” or “step for.”

While the preferred embodiments of the present invention have beendescribed in detail, it will be understood that modifications andadaptations to the embodiments shown may occur to one of ordinary skillin the art without departing from the scope of the present invention asset forth in the following claims. Thus, the scope of this invention isto be construed according to the appended claims and not limited by thespecific details disclosed in the exemplary embodiments.

What is claimed is:
 1. A method for a content protection licensingagency to generate keys for protected content that enablesidentification of a compromised media device, comprising: dividing atree-based media key block into subtrees, said tree-based media keyblock comprising media key variants and initial values, wherein aparticular media device is associated with one of said subtrees;assigning a separate media key variant to each of said subtrees;creating a key transformation program for media that comprises protectedcontent, wherein said program: executes on a particular media devicewhen said device attempts to decrypt said content, transforms initialvalues into media key variations, and identifies to said agency whichsubtree among said subtrees is associated with said particular mediadevice; storing said key transformation program on media that comprisesprotected content; and tracing a compromised media device of saidcontent by identifying a subdivided subtree used by the compromisedmedia device to circumvent said content, wherein the subtree iscalculated when performing said transformation of initial values, andrevoking the compromised media device by removing said identifiedsubdivided subtree from an associated subtree if said subdivided subtreeis a leaf of said tree-based media key block.
 2. The method of claim 1,wherein the initial values are random numbers.
 3. The method of claim 1,wherein the media is selected from the group consisting of: a CD, a DVD,and a recordable disk.
 4. A computer program product for a contentprotection licensing agency to generate keys for protected content thatenables identification of a compromised media device, the computerprogram product comprising a non-transitory computer readable storagemedium having computer program code embodied therewith, said programcode being readable/executable by said device to: divide a tree-basedmedia key block into subtrees, said tree-based media key blockcomprising media key variants and initial values, wherein a particularmedia device is associated with one of said subtrees; assign a separatemedia key variant to each of said subtrees; and create a keytransformation program for media that comprises protected content,wherein said program: executes on a particular media device when saiddevice attempts to decrypt said content, transforms initial values intomedia key variations, and identifies to said agency which subtree amongsaid subtrees is associated with said particular media device; storesaid key transformation program on media that comprises protectedcontent; and trace a compromised media device of said content byidentifying a subdivided subtree used by the compromised media device tocircumvent said content, wherein the subtree is calculated whenperforming said transformation of initial values, and revoke thecompromised media device by removing said identified subdivided subtreefrom an associated subtree if said subdivided subtree is a leaf of saidtree-based media key block.
 5. The computer program product of claim 4,wherein the initial values are random numbers.
 6. The computer programproduct of claim 4, wherein the media is selected from the groupconsisting of: a CD, a DVD, and a recordable disk.
 7. A system for acontent protection licensing agency to generate keys for protectedcontent that enables identification of a compromised media device, thesystem comprising a non-transitory computer readable storage mediumhaving computer program code embodied therewith, said program code beingexecutable to: divide a tree-based media key block into subtrees, saidtree-based media key block comprising media key variants and initialvalues, wherein a particular media device is associated with one of saidsubtrees; assign a separate media key variant to each of said subtrees;and create a key transformation program for media that comprisesprotected content, wherein said program: executes on a particular mediadevice when said device attempts to decrypt said content, transformsinitial values into media key variations, and identifies to said agencywhich subtree among said subtrees is associated with said particularmedia device; store said key transformation program on media thatcomprises protected content; and trace a compromised media device ofsaid content by identifying a subdivided subtree used by the compromisedmedia device to circumvent said content, wherein the subtree iscalculated when performing said transformation of initial values, andrevoke the compromised media device by removing said identifiedsubdivided subtree from an associated subtree if said subdivided subtreeis a leaf of said tree-based media key block.
 8. The system of claim 7,wherein the initial values are random numbers.
 9. The system of claim 7,wherein the media is selected from the group consisting of: a CD, a DVD,and a recordable disk.